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Protecting the Environment by Addressing Market 
Failure in Intellectual Property Law: 
Why Compulsory Licensing of Green Technologies 
Might Make Sense in the United States: A Balancing 
Approach 
Environmental degradation is a growing concern for 
governments throughout the world, but especially in the United 
States.1 According to most experts, global climate change presents 
one of the most pressing environmental problems in the world 
today.2 Other significant environmental problems include degraded 
air3 and water quality,4 collapsing fisheries,5 overloaded landfills,6 
and accumulating waste in the world’s oceans.7 Imagine that a 
 
 1. The international community has many organizations devoted to understanding 
environmental degradation, but perhaps the best reports on international environmental issues 
are produced within the United Nations. World Risk Report 2013: Focus: Environmental 
Degradation and Disasters, available at http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/10487.pdf. 
Domestically, all you have to do is pick up a newspaper to see the multitude of environmental 
issues making headlines. See, e.g., Florida Sues BP Over Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/business/energy-environment/florida-sues-
bp-over-gulf-oil-spill.html?ref=earth&_r=0; Bettina Boxall, Bay Area Air Pollution Reaches 
Devils Postpile National Monument, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-air-pollution-devils-postpile-
20130424,0,5734715.story; Juliet Eilperin & Steven Mufson, Many Coal Sludge 
Impoundments Have Weak Walls, Federal Study Says, WASH. POST (April 24, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/many-coal-sludge-impound
ments-have-weak-walls-federal-study-says/2013/04/24/76c5be2a-acf9-11e2-a8b9-
2a63d75b5459_story.html. 
 2. Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306:5702 
SCIENCE 1686 (2004). 
 3. See, e.g., C. Arden Pope, III et al., Fine-particle Air Pollution and Life Expectancy in 
the United States, 360(4) NEW ENG. J. MED. 376 (2009). 
 4. See, e.g., Robert I. McDonald et al., Global Urban Growth and the Geography of 
Water Availability, Quality, and Delivery, 40(5) AMBIO 437 (2011). 
 5. See, e.g., Malin L. Pinsky et al., Unexpected Patterns of Fisheries Collapse in the 
World’s Oceans, 108(20) PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 8317 
(2011). 
 6. See, e.g., Christine Longo & Jeffrey Wagner, Bridging Legal and Economic 
Perspective on Interstate Municipal Solid Waste Disposal in the U.S., 31 WASTE MANAGEMENT 
147 (2011). 
 7. Jocelyn Kaiser, The Dirt on Ocean Garbage Patches, 328 SCIENCE 1506 (2010). 
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solution to any one of these problems was within the grasp of 
humanity, but was quickly hidden away by those interested in 
perpetuating the status quo. This phenomenon has been well 
documented8 and is commonly referred to as patent suppression.9 
Patent suppression is the process by which an individual or a 
company obtains a patent for an emerging technology in order to 
prevent that technology from coming to market.10 Under the current 
United States patent law regime, it is possible for a company, fearing 
competition from an emerging technology, to buy the patent for the 
new technology in order to suppress it.11 In this situation, the new 
patent holder can refuse to use the new technology while 
simultaneously refusing to license it to any other market participants, 
eliminating any possibility that the technology be put to beneficial 
use during the life of the patent. In a world that desperately needs to 
address its environmental problems, this use of U.S. patent law 
protection can delay the development of environmentally important 
technologies. This paper will address one possible solution to this 
problem: compulsory licensing. 
Of course, any compulsory licensing regime must address 
competing policy goals. On one hand, a compulsory licensing statute 
can be a tool that the government uses to ensure beneficial 
technologies are not suppressed and are made available to the 
market. On the other hand, compulsory licensing laws risk eroding 
the value of a patent to the point that the incentive to innovate is 
destroyed. After all, the patent system exists as a mechanism for 
rewarding those who create beneficial technologies.12 There are 
already a few narrowly applied statutes in the United States which 
 
 8. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 9. Richard Dunford, The Suppression of Technology as a Strategy for Controlling Resource 
Dependence, 32 ADMIN. SCI Q. 512 (1987); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation 
Efficiencies, and the Suppression of Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487 (1998); Kurt M. 
Saunders & Linda Levin, Better, Faster, Cheaper—Later: What Happens When Technologies are 
Suppressed, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 23 (2004). 
 10. See, e.g., Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a 
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 393 (2002). 
 11. SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d. Cir. 1981) (holding that as long as 
a patent is acquired legally, it is not a violation of antitrust law to use the patent to the “full 
extent allowed under patent law” which includes preventing third parties from using a 
technology even when the patent holder itself is not using the patented technology). 
 12. 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:6 (2d ed.). 
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provide for compulsory licensing of some technologies.13 This paper 
will argue that a mandatory licensing statute which encompasses 
more environmentally beneficial technologies can overcome the 
problem of patent suppression while still maintaining the incentive to 
innovate. Part I provides a background discussion of some important 
environmental policy considerations, including the importance of 
technological advances as a means of solving environmental 
problems and the policy considerations surrounding patent law and 
compulsory licensing. Part II discusses why a broader compulsory 
licensing regime could be beneficial. Part III addresses some of the 
primary concerns over such a policy and discusses how we might 
potentially balance the conflicting policy goals. Part IV concludes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Within the academic literature on environmental policy, there is 
no paucity of work discussing a market-based approach to solving 
environmental problems. Garret Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons 
and the long line of related commons analysis describe how many 
environmental problems arise from market failure.14 That line of 
literature generally suggests the possibility of either privatization or 
regulation of public resources as a means of addressing market 
failure.15 This section addresses another piece of the puzzle: 
technological innovation. Similar to Hardin’s discussion of the 
commons, technological innovation is another area wherein a 
market-based approach may be helpfully applied to environmental 
policy. This section discusses how technological advancement may 
help to solve environmental problems. Then it discusses some of the 
conflicting policy considerations in trying to ensure that there are 
both adequate incentives for inventors to innovate while 
simultaneously ensuring that new innovations are diffused into the 
marketplace. 
 
 13. See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
 14. See Garret Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1242 (1968) (discussing the 
problems inherent with public goods—where everybody has access but nobody has the right to 
exclude). 
 15. Id. See also Michael Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Lea Kosnik, The Anticommons and the 
Environment, 30:101 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 206–17 (2012) (discussing the opposite problem—
where nobody has access because too many people have the right to exclude). 
DO NOT DELETE 8/18/2015 10:37 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
674 
A. Technological Advancement as a Solution for Environmental 
Problems 
Technological advancement has the potential to solve many of 
the world’s most dire environmental problems. While the Industrial 
Revolution brought with it a slew of new environmental problems, 
the development of environmentally friendly technologies that 
followed led to significant environmental gains.16 Catalytic 
converters developed in the 1970s helped to reduce the aggregate 
amount of harmful automobile emission despite an overall increase in 
the number of vehicles on the road.17 Recent advances in sulfur 
scrubber technology have led to modern scrubbers capable reducing 
sulfur emissions by up to ninety-five percent.18 The threat of further 
deforestation has been reduced by advances in recycling technology 
as well as the advent of email, paperless document storage, and other 
technological advances helping to reduce the public demand for 
paper.19 
While these technological advances have helped to make 
remarkable environmental gains in the last century, there remains 
an enormous potential for further progress as new technologies are 
developed. Advances in battery technology could make it possible 
to completely displace the need for combustible engine-powered 
automobiles.20 Similarly, advances in large-scale energy production 
technologies, like solar power plants, may help drastically reduce 
the need to burn fossil fuels to generate electricity. Beyond these, 
there are almost certainly technological possibilities which have not 
yet been contemplated that could mitigate environmental problems 
and make further environmental gains. 
 
 16. Dominique Foray & Arnulf Grübler, Technology and the Environment: An 
Overview. 53(1) TECHNOLOGICAL FORCASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 3 (1996). 
 17. David Gerard & Lester B. Lave, Implementing Technology-forcing Policies: The 1970 
Clean Air Act Amendments and the Introduction of Advanced Automotive Emissions Controls in 
the United States, 72(7) TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOC. CHANGE 761, 761–62 
(2005). 
 18. Sulfur Dioxide Scrubbers, DUKE-ENERGY.COM, http://www.duke-energy.co
m/environment/air-quality/sulfur-dioxide-scrubbers.asp (last visited April 25, 2013). 
 19. EPA, Going Paperless with Technology, WASTEWISE UPDATE, http://www.e
pa.gov/osw/conserve/smm/wastewise/pubs/wwupda5.pdf (last visited April 25, 2013). 
 20. See, e.g., Steve Levin, The Great Battery Race, 182 FOREIGN POL’Y 88–95 (2010); 
John Baker, New Technology and Possible Advances in Energy Storage, 36 ENERGY STORAGE 
4368, 4368–73 (2008). 
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B. Encouraging Innovation 
While some of these technologies could have perhaps been 
invented without governmental involvement, governments have 
demonstrated an interest in creating a legal system that encourages 
innovation.21 There are several strategies that governments can use 
to encourage innovation, but patent law has some advantages that 
the other strategies do not. One strategy is through a policy often 
referred to as technology forcing, whereby the government creates a 
requirement that can only be met by advancement in technology, 
thereby “forcing” the industry to either innovate or cease 
operation.22 The problem with this approach is that it is only 
effective as a means of encouraging development of technologies 
within the foresight of Congress or relevant regulatory agencies.23 
Another strategy is direct funding of important technologies.24 
This is a good way for the government to ensure that funding is 
 
 21. See, e.g., SUNIL MANI, GOVERNMENT, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY: 
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2002). 
 22. One of the best examples of technology forcing policies leading to the development 
of environmentally friendly technologies comes in the development of the catalytic converter. 
See David Gerard & Lester B. Lave, Implementing Technology-forcing Policies: The 1970 Clean 
Air Act Amendments and the Introduction of Advanced Automotive Emissions Controls in the 
United States, 72(7) TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOC. CHANGE 761, 761–62 
(2005). In 1970, Congress passed an amendment to the Clean Air Act that required drastic 
automobile emission reductions by 1975. Id. In 1970, the technology necessary to meet these 
rigorous standards had not yet been developed. Id. The auto industry was forced to either 
develop the necessary technology or be denied the right to sell their cars in the United States. 
Id. As a result, the automobile industry developed the catalytic converter which—together with 
subsequent technology—has led to an aggregate decrease in greenhouse gas emissions even in 
the face of a 34% increase in the number of vehicles on the road. Id. 
 23. Technological forcing basically leads to a game of chicken between the government 
and the innovator. It has been reported that in 1970, Congress had reason to believe that the 
new pollution standards were within the realm of technological possibility. For the auto 
industry, see JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: DETROIT’S BIG THREE AND THE POLITICS OF 
POLLUTION (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows 2000). See also, JAMES E. KRIER AND 
EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL 
EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940–75 (1977). There would have 
been a problem, however, if Congress had guessed wrong. If the innovator is unable to 
produce the necessary technology in time, the industry is harmed. When the regulated industry 
constitutes a major part of the country’s economy, this may have far-reaching economic and 
political impacts. For this reason, Congress is likely to be reluctant to require a significant 
technological advancement for a major industry unless it reasonably expects the industry to be 
able to comply. Thus, while this type of incentive for innovation can be effective, its 
effectiveness is likely to be limited to those technologies that can reasonably be foreseen by 
Congress. 
 24. MANI, supra note 21, at 107. 
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directed towards technological innovation that is particularly 
important. The problem, however, is similar to the problems 
associated with technology forcing: it is only helpfully applied to 
technologies within government foresight. 
Patents, by comparison, allow the government to incentivize 
an infinite number of possibilities. Because patents are available 
for any invention so long as it is novel, useful, and not obvious,25 
patents serve as an incentive for an endless potential of beneficial 
innovation. Patents provide a government-protected monopoly on 
a new innovation.26 By excluding others from use of the patented 
technology, the inventor can profit from his or her invention 
either by manufacturing and selling the invention himself, or by 
licensing out the right to use the invention to others.27 
Although patent law has a longstanding tradition within the 
United States, the extent to which patent law should protect patent 
holders is sometimes unclear. A brief historical context of the patent 
law system will demonstrate the social contract that exists between 
society and an individual patent holder. By understanding this social 
contract, it becomes apparent that compulsory licensing might make 
sense as a way to ensure that the goals of the social contract are met. 
1. Understanding patent law 
American patent law has its roots in pre-revolutionary English 
law. The English monarchy, at times, granted monopolies to certain 
artisans, allowing them exclusive rights in their crafts.28 These 
monopolies allowed the privileged artisans to charge exorbitant 
prices because nobody else could compete. This practice was seen by 
many as corrupt, and as a result, Parliament eventually passed the 
Statute of Monopolies in 1624 which limited the monarch’s power 
to grant monopolies by allowing the monarch to grant monopolies 
only for new inventions.29 
The debate over government-sanctioned patents did not end in 
England. Thomas Jefferson, at the time of the framing of the 
 
 25. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101–103 (West 2015). 
 26. 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:6 (2d ed.). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-
1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 257–58 (2001). 
 29. Id. 
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Constitution, sought to include an anti-monopoly provision within 
the Constitution itself.30 He and others viewed government-
sanctioned monopolies as tyrannical and feared they would stifle 
competition.31 Others, however, recognized that allowing inventors 
the exclusive right to their inventions could serve as a means of 
incentivizing innovation.32 They understood that if inventors have a 
protected right to exclusively profit from their inventions, those 
inventors are more likely to risk the time and effort in attempting to 
develop new technological innovation. This is especially true when, 
like now, the development of a new technology often requires a 
substantial investment in research and development.33 This type of 
investment may only be worthwhile if the inventor will have a 
protected legal right to profit from his invention. 
The founding fathers eventually came to a compromise, deciding 
that a limited monopoly could be a beneficial way to encourage 
technological advancement while balancing the needs of the public. 
The Constitution does not contain a specific provision outlawing 
harmful monopolies; instead it gives Congress authority “to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.”34 This provision not only creates a 
constitutional basis for allowing monopolies, but it also provides 
guidance on the scope and justification of that authority: Congress 
may authorize such monopolies for limited times for the purpose of 
promoting innovation. This balance between two objectives 
constitutes a social contract between the inventor and society at 
large.35 The inventor receives a limited monopoly in the form of a 
 
 30. PATENT LAW BASICS § 1:5–6. See also Patents, THOMAS JEFFERSON 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/patents. This, of 
course, was not a unique position to take at the time. Jefferson was probably influenced by his 
contemporary—economist Adam Smith—who said: “Monopoly . . . is a great enemy to good 
management.” ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
 31. Patents, supra note 30. 
 32. Id. 
 33. FTC, Chapter 3: Business Testimony: Current Innovation Landscape in Selected 
Industries, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 29 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited April 25, 2013). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 35. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1575, 1600 (2003) (providing a succinct explanation of what the authors call Propsect 
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patent in exchange for bringing new technologies into the 
marketplace. 
Judicial interpretation of this constitutional provision and the 
ensuring development of the American patent system reinforce the 
notion that inventors may receive limited monopolies in order to 
benefit society. Indeed, the Supreme Court has regularly recognized 
that the purpose of patent law is to induce new development and 
bring new products to market.36 It is with this same principle in 
mind that patents are filed with the patent office—making a 
description of the technology a matter of public record.37 An 
inventor can have exclusive rights to develop, manufacture and sell 
the invention during the life of the patent, but once the patent has 
expired, the technology can be further diffused into the marketplace, 
available to anyone interested in developing the technology for their 
own purposes.38 
If Congress is not careful, however, this social contract may 
become too one-sided. If the monopoly becomes too strong, then 
the diffusion of technology may never occur. A patent holder may 
decide not to grant permission for others to use or sell his invention, 
and as a result, others will be unable to innovate further and expand 
upon the invention. While in some circumstances the harmful effects 
of this type of patent suppression may not be far-reaching, in other 
circumstances, such as when a new technology has the potential to 
address urgent issues, patent suppression may be more problematic.39 
For example, a patent is normally good for twenty years,40 but in 
some circumstances, the patent can be extended even beyond that.41 
Given the urgency of some environmental problems, it may 
unreasonable to wait twenty years or longer to be able to ensure 
market access to an important technology. 
 
Theory, which outlines the give and take between a society and inventors as it is acted out 
under patent policy). 
 36. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533–34 (1966) (noting that “one of 
the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning 
discoveries and inventions”). 
 37. 1 WEST ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 1:13 (noting that “one of the purposes of 
patent systems is to disclose inventions to the public”). 
 38. 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:20 (2d ed.). 
 39. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 40. 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:20 (2d ed.). 
 41. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 8/18/2015 10:37 AM 
671 Addressing Market Failure in Intellectual Property Law 
 679 
2. Abuse of patent law protections: patent suppression 
Concern over patent suppression is not hypothetical. There have 
been a number of documented cases in which this phenomenon has 
taken place. In each case, patent suppression has been a means of 
hindering the progress of new technologies. Inasmuch as patent law 
is authorized under the Constitution in order to “promote the 
progress science and the useful arts,” patent suppression—whereby 
patent holders purposefully acquire patents only to prohibit their use 
or development—is contrary to that purpose and represents a clear 
abuse of that law. This section briefly explores a few examples of 
patent suppression and explains how the current legal framework of 
intellectual property and antitrust law is generally insufficient to stop 
the abuse. 
Perhaps one of the most well-known examples of patent 
suppression was brought to the forefront of public attention by the 
film Who Killed the Electric Car.42 This documentary details the 
development and eventual suppression of battery technology capable 
of powering zero-emission automobiles.43 According to the 
documentary, General Motors acquired a small battery technology 
company, Ovonics—which had made tremendous advances in 
battery technology—and began to develop an electric car that would 
eventually be named the EV-1.44 When California’s political climate 
and the looming threats of burdensome regulations made GM 
nervous about the timing of the technology’s release, Texaco (which 
was soon after acquired by Chevron) stepped in and purchased the 
rights to the battery technology in order to suppress it.45 
Another example occurred in the light bulb industry in the 
early 1900s.46 General Electric, which had a large stake in the 
incandescent light bulb industry, purchased the patent for a more-
efficient fluorescent light bulb.47 In order to maximize its profits 
for the incandescent light bulbs, General Electric sat on the patent 
 
 42. WHO KILLED THE ELECTRIC CAR (Plinyminor 2006). 
 43. Id. Specifically, the car mentioned in the documentary is GM’s Chevy EV-1. Id. 
According to the film, the car was completely battery powered and could drive distances up to 
160 miles on a single charge. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Richard Dunford, The Suppression of Technology as a Strategy for Controlling Resource 
Dependence, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 512, 516 (1987). 
 47. Id. 
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for the fluorescent lights, refusing to either bring the technology to 
market itself or to license the technology to other market 
participants.48 Not until Sylvania, another electronics company, 
successfully marketed a similar technology did General Electric 
begin to use its patented florescent light bulb technology.49 
Bell Telephone also implemented patent suppression techniques 
in order to preserve the status quo.50 A 1920s investigation by the 
federal government found that Bell Telephone had purchased and 
suppressed over 3,000 patents.51 Bell had developed a practice of 
acquiring patents for the sole purpose of keeping those technologies 
out of the hands of their competitors.52 
The law regarding patent suppression has not always been clear 
and while it appears that antitrust remedies may be available as a 
means of preventing some instances of patent suppression, such 
remedies are still not generally available.53 In 1886, a federal district 
court held that a patent holder could only be guaranteed legal 
protection of its patent if the holder was actually using the patented 
technology.54 However, in 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
patent non-use does not foreclose the patent holder’s right to 
protection under the law.55 
With the birth of antitrust law, new remedies became available 
to stop anticompetitive behavior through which powerful 
companies tried to eliminate competition.56 While it may appear 
that patent suppression would fall into this category of behavior, 
courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to apply antitrust 
remedies to cases of patent suppression.57 For example, in SCM v. 
Xerox, the Supreme Court held that so long as a patent is acquired 
legally, it is not a violation of antitrust law to use the patent to the 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 517. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003). 
 54. See, e.g., Hoe v. Knap, 27 F. 204, 205 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886). 
 55. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429–30 (1908). 
 56. See generally, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006) (originally passed in 
1890); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–17 (2006) (originally passed in 1914), and the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006) (originally passed in 1914). 
 57. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d. Cir. 1981. 
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“full extent allowed under patent law,” which includes preventing 
third parties from using a technology, even when the patent holder 
itself is not using the patented technology.58 The holding of this 
case has been followed in subsequent decisions and is still good 
law.59 Thus, despite the similarities between patent suppression and 
those problems generally meant to be addressed by antitrust laws, it 
seems that antitrust law by itself is insufficient to stop patent 
suppression. 
3. A solution to patent suppression: compulsory licensing 
One remaining way to avoid technology suppression is through 
compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing eliminates the 
possibility of patent suppression by requiring a patent holder, under 
certain circumstances, to license its technology to others for 
“reasonable” compensation. Compulsory licensing is not a new 
idea. While it is not commonly relied upon as a means of ensuring 
the diffusion of new technologies, compulsory licensing is already 
an important part of American law. Compulsory licensing laws exist 
by statute in some circumstances to be described below. 
Additionally, courts occasionally create a de facto compulsory 
licensing situation by refusing to enjoin patent infringers. This 
existing compulsory licensing framework, while helpful, is severely 
limited in its ability to address the full scale of patent suppression. 
The Clean Air Act, Atomic Energy Act, and the Plant Variety 
Protection Act all include compulsory licensing provisions that are 
applied narrowly to specific types of technologies.60 The Clean Air 
Act, for example, requires that when a technology is necessary in 
order to comply with certain federally established emissions 
standards and is the only such technology available, it must be 
licensed for a reasonable price to others seeking to comply with the 
emissions standards.61 The Atomic Energy Act gives the Atomic 
Energy Commission the authority to designate certain atomic energy 
technologies as being within the public interest, and thus subjects 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Digital Sun v. The Toro Co., 2011 WL 1044502 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 
2011). 
 60. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2183 
(2012); Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012). 
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them to compulsory licensing to either the Commission itself or to 
those authorized by the Commission.62 This authority has been 
construed by the courts fairly narrowly and does not include, for 
example, patents for safety-related inventions such as anti-radiation 
chemical compounds.63 The Plant Variety Protection Act gives the 
Secretary of Agriculture the authority to designate certain patented 
plant varieties as open to the public in exchange for “reasonable 
remuneration” in the event of a shortage of fiber, food, or feed.64 
In addition to these very specific compulsory licensing 
provisions, the United States government has additional rights in 
regards to third party patents under Section 1498 of Title 28. The 
statute dictates that whenever a patented technology is 
“manufactured by or for the United States,” without a license, the 
patent holder may sue the United States government for “reasonable 
compensation” but may not be granted an injunction.65 Though 
limited in its application to use by the federal government, in 
practice this statute constitutes the equivalent of a compulsory 
license. When a patent holder’s only remedy is to receive 
compensation for the use of his patent, the outcome is practically 
identical to that of a compulsory license situation. 
In addition to these statutory provisions for compulsory 
licensing, courts can sometimes create a de facto compulsory 
licensing regime for others by refusing to enjoin patent infringers. 
While courts will ordinarily give injunctive relief against patent 
infringers, this is not always the case.66 The patent code says that 
courts may grant injunctive relief in cases of patent infringement.67 
Sometimes, in the public interest, courts determine that it is better 
to allow the infringer to continue use of the patented technology 
while paying damages.68 For example, in City of Milwaukee v. 
Activated Sludge, the City of Milwaukee was using patented 
 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2012). 
 63. Piper v. Atomic Energy Com’n, 502 F.2d 1393, 1399–1401 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
 64. 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012). 
 65. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006). 
 66. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) 
(noting that while ordinarily courts provide injunctive relief against patent infringers, but still 
holding that an injunction against a water treatment plant would be against the public 
interest); but see Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (indicating that the 
standard for obtaining an injunction may be becoming more difficult). 
 67. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 68. Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d at 593. 
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technology in one of its waste treatment plants, but didn’t have a 
valid license from the patent holder. The court refused to enjoin the 
city from using the patent and instead required the city pay damages 
to the patent holder.69 In so doing, the court created a compulsory 
license in fact; the city was permitted to continue use of the 
technology while paying monetary damages, just as a licensee would 
pay a licensing fee for licensed technology. 
Each of these examples of compulsory licensing within U.S. law 
has potential to prevent patent suppression, but their limitations in 
scope and applicability prevent them from solving the problem in a 
substantive way. Under the Clean Air Act, the Atomic Energy Act, 
and the Plant Variety Protection Act, compulsory licensing 
provisions apply only to a very small subset of technology and only in 
very specific circumstances. As a result, technologies outside of those 
specific industries can still be suppressed. Similarly, compulsory 
licensing to the United States government, while it can occur with a 
broader set of technology, does not allow suppressed technology to 
reach the national marketplace where it can be diffused and 
innovated upon, because only the government or its agents are 
authorized to manufacture otherwise suppressed technologies. Right 
now, a patented technology can be ensured entry into the 
marketplace only when a court creates a de facto compulsory license. 
Even this form of compulsory licensing is limited in effectiveness 
because the suppressed technology is still only legally available to the 
firm or individual who first sued for infringing on the patent. To 
really address problems associated with patent suppression, it is 
necessary to create a compulsory licensing regime that reaches a 
wider variety of technologies and guarantees access to a larger 
segment of the market. 
II. EXPANDING COMPULSORY LICENSING LAWS TO INCLUDE MORE 
GREEN TECHNOLOGIES 
Broadening the application of compulsory licensing laws can help 
to reduce the suppression of important technologies; it is impossible 
to completely suppress a technology when the law requires that the 
holder license it to others. While there are some risks associated with 
 
 69. Id. 
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expanding compulsory licensing,70 there are tremendous benefits as 
well. As discussed previously, the constitutional justification for the 
protection of a patent is to promote scientific and technological 
progress.71 Given the pressing nature of many of our environmental 
problems, progress in this area of science and technology is especially 
important. Expanding the application of compulsory licensing to 
include more green technologies will promote scientific and 
technological progress in solving environmental problems. 
Specifically, compulsory licensing can promote such progress by: 1) 
ensuring prompt access to important technologies, 2) increasing the 
likelihood of future innovation, and 3) decreasing judicial 
inefficiencies. 
A. Ensuring Prompt Access to Environmentally Important Technologies 
The most obvious advantage of a compulsory licensing policy is 
that it ensures that technological advances cannot be suppressed. 
There is no progress when a patent holder obtains a patent and 
refuses to use the patented technology. In these instances, progress 
can be slowed by twenty years or more, as current patent laws give a 
filed patent a life of twenty years, and that timeline may also be 
extended for various reasons.72 Given the inherent urgency of solving 
certain environmental problems (such as climate change), a 
prolonged suppression of important technology could be 
detrimental. Any social costs associated with the expansion of 
compulsory licensing may be worthwhile if society can make swift 
progress in addressing environmental concerns—ending 
environmental tragedies decades earlier than otherwise possible. 
 
 70. The fundamental concerns over compulsory licensing are addressed in Part III. 
There are a number of those who claim that a compulsory licensing regime lowers the value of 
affected patents. See, e.g., Neel Maitra, Access to Environmentally Sound Technology in the 
Developing World: A Proposed Alternative to Compulsory Licensing, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
407, 419–427 (2010); Jeffry C. Gerber & Peter W. Kitson, Compulsory Licensing of Patents 
Under the Clean Air Act of 1970, J.  PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 650, 676–77 (1972). While this may be 
true, it is important to keep in mind that compulsory licensing does not completely eliminate 
the incentive to innovate. Compulsory licensing under each of the circumstances contemplated 
in U.S. law, still allows the patent holder to receive payment for the use of its patent. 
 70. Contents and term of patent; provisional rights, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 72. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). See also, 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:6 (2d ed.). 
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B. Encouraging Further Innovation 
Furthermore, even if compulsory licensing decreases the 
incentive for individuals to innovate, it may still increase the overall 
level of innovation within the marketplace. It has been suggested 
that when inventors sell the patents of their inventions to those who 
can put all their resources into further development of the 
technology, the ensuing specialization makes for a more efficient 
marketplace: inventors reinvest their profits into future inventions 
and developers are able to invest their resources to manufacturing or 
marketing or whatever their specialty may be.73 This type of 
specialization leads to a more efficient use of resources which in turn 
leads to greater innovation. 
Additionally, as new and important technologies are released into 
the market, those who would have otherwise been without access to 
the technology can use and innovate upon them. Innovation may be 
spurred just by ensuring access to new technologies. 
C. Increasing Judicial Efficiency 
Finally, a broader compulsory licensing policy could help to 
decrease judicial inefficiencies. As has been discussed previously, 
except under the very narrow statutory compulsory licensing 
provisions in the Clean Air Act, Atomic Energy Act, and Plant 
Variety Protection Act, the best way for anyone other than the 
government to access a suppressed technology is to infringe on a 
patent and ask the court not to grant an injunction prohibiting use 
of the patented technology.74 A judgment requiring payment of 
damages but expressly denying the right to an injunction may be the 
closest that a company can come to establishing a legally defensible 
right to an otherwise suppressed technology. Requiring a potential 
technology user to go through the litigation process in order to 
ensure access to the technology is judicially inefficient. A compulsory 
licensing policy will incentivize patent holders to come to the 
bargaining table. If a patent holder knows that the law requires him 
or her to license the patent, he or she will be less likely to refuse a 
 
 73. William A. Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corporate 
Inventors to Sell Patents. 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1123–28 (2004); KENNETH PORT ET AL, 
LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2d ed. 2005). 
 74. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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reasonable offer to license the technology and will be more likely to 
strike a deal, thereby reducing the need for litigation. 
When patent holders and potential licensees are encouraged to 
reach deals on their own, there is less need for the courts to be 
involved. As a result, court dockets, which are already overloaded in 
many circumstances, can focus on other issues. More importantly for 
the purposes of this discussion, this also means that technologies can 
be made available to the market more quickly. Instead of relying on 
the expensive and time-consuming litigation process, patent holders 
and licensees will come to an agreement on their own terms. This 
also reduces the frequency with which courts will be forced to 
estimate the just compensation for use of the patented technology—
a task that courts are often ill-prepared to undertake. 
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN OVER COMPULSORY 
LICENSING: KILLING THE GOLDEN GOOSE 
There is an important concern pervading the relevant literature 
regarding the possibility of expanded compulsory licensing: forcing 
innovators to license their technology will reduce the value of the 
patent and, as a result, decrease the incentive to innovate.75 When an 
inventor invents something, she may very likely want to sell the 
rights for her invention to the highest bidder. Under the current 
system, the highest bidder may be a company whose only interest in 
the patent is in suppressing it as a means of eliminating potential 
competition.76 If that company is no longer able to suppress the 
patent, then its willingness to pay for the patent may be decreased or 
eliminated altogether. As a result, the value of the patent to the 
inventor is likewise decreased. Because the value of the patent serves 
as a primary incentive to innovate, the reduction in value of the 
patent could lessen the incentive to innovate. 
This paper has already discussed how the development of new 
“green” technologies represents an important means of solving 
environmental problems.77 If green technology is compared to the 
mythical golden egg, then the system that fosters development of 
 
 75. Maitra, supra note 70, at 419–27 (2010); Gerber & Kitson, supra note 70, at 676–
77. 
 76. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.2 (discussion of General Electric, Bell Telephones, and 
Texaco). 
 77. See supra Part I.A. 
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green technology is the golden goose.78 If we eliminate the 
likelihood of further innovation by trying to ensure access to current 
beneficial technologies, we are saving a golden egg but killing the 
golden goose. By carefully assessing the possibility of eroding 
incentive and creating a policy that addresses those possibilities, we 
will be more likely to develop a compulsory licensing regime that 
avoids unnecessary negative repercussions on innovation while 
simultaneously promoting progress in the development of 
environmental technology. While there is reason to believe that this 
fundamental concern over compulsory licensing is often overstated, 
any concerns can be largely assuaged by a careful consideration of 
both the price and scope of compulsory licenses. 
A. Overstated Concern? 
The concern that compulsory licensing could reduce the 
likeliness of innovation makes sense in theory; the monetary value 
of a patent serves as a primary incentive for inventors to create new 
patentable technology. Even still, there may be sufficient benefits 
stemming from the development of new innovation that companies 
will continue to invest in research and development. One study 
conducted by Frederic M. Scherer suggests that this might be the 
case.79 Scherer surveyed a number of multinational companies to 
learn what effects mandatory licensing requirements had had on 
their incentive to innovate.80 Specifically, he considered the level of 
funding companies contributed to research and development, and 
found that compulsory licensing provisions had little to no effect 
on the level of funding provided to research and development.81 
While Scherer’s study alone cannot conclusively indicate that the 
concerns over compulsory licensing are completely unfounded, it 
does indicate that the concern may be overstated. Scherer’s study 
suggests that even in the presence of compulsory licensing laws, a 
significant number of companies still have sufficient incentive to 
warrant substantial investment in innovation. Still, policy makers 
 
 78. Cf. JACK AND THE BEANSTALK. For those unfamiliar with the story: in this fairy tale, 
Jack climbs the beanstalk to reach a mythical land in the clouds. One of the treasures he finds is 
a golden goose which lays golden eggs. 
 79. Frederic M. Scherer, Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 
7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 171–72 (2009). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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should be careful about needlessly eroding incentives for innovation. 
By carefully looking at the price and scope of mandatory license 
agreements, policy makers can further ease the concerns over an 
expanded compulsory licensing regime. 
B. Getting the Price Right 
Getting the price right is important. To avoid drastically 
undervaluing a patent, and thereby undermining the incentive to 
innovate, any license resulting from a compulsory licensing regime 
should be compensated as close to its fair market value as possible. 
Even from the basic assumption that the fair market value is the price 
at which a typical patent holder would license a patent to a typical 
licensee,82 determining the correct price for a patent license is an 
extremely difficult task.83 There are a variety of methods that can be 
used to approximate the value of a technology license, though the 
most accurate methods can be remarkably complex.84 To accurately 
pinpoint the fair market value might require a team of economists, 
mathematicians and statisticians a considerable amount of time. 
While this type of analysis is by no means unhelpful, it is outside the 
scope of this paper. Any economic analysis conducted by such 
experts may be helpful in adjusting the way courts determine the fair 
market value of a patent license, but this section will discuss the ways 
in which a well-drafted policy may circumvent the immediate need 
for such complex analysis: by encouraging both the patent holder 
and the potential licensee to come to the bargaining table where they 
can come to a licensing agreement that is beneficial to both parties. 
Like the colossal bear walking the tightrope in a circus act, the ideal 
policy will be strong enough to ensure that important patents are not 
suppressed, but nimble enough to avoid disrupting the fair market 
price of the patent. A strong policy will ensure that patent holders 
 
 82. Of course, the fair market value is often assumed to be “the price at which the 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under 
any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.” 26 
C.F.R. § 1.170A–1 (2008). However, under the circumstances addressed in this paper, we are 
worried that some sellers may be unwilling to sell at virtually any price. Therefore, it makes 
more sense to look at the price at which a typical seller would sell to a typical buyer—
eliminating the market disruption that occurs from a blatant refusal to sell. 
 83. KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 181–207 (2d ed. 2005). 
 84. Id. 
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come to the table. A nimble policy will ensure that it is applicable to 
a wide variety of technologies by avoiding they type of across-the-
board requirements in price methodologies that may be helpful in 
one industry but quite inappropriate in another. 
One way that existing compulsory licensing policies have ensured 
that their application is sufficiently nimble is to require that any 
licensing fee be “reasonable.” A reasonableness standard leaves 
plenty of room for the patent holder and the potential licensee to 
come to terms that are beneficial to both sides. The problem 
inherent in such a vague term, however, is that the two parties are 
likely to disagree on what a “reasonable” fee should be. The purpose 
of this policy is not to ensure guaranteed, low-cost access to 
important technologies for anyone who needs it. While this type of 
argument is frequently attached to the discussion of international 
compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical technologies, where the 
primary concern is whether citizens of developing world countries 
have access to life-saving drugs,85 this is not the primary concern 
here. This paper is primarily concerned with the ability of patent 
holders to completely suppress important technologies such that they 
become completely unavailable to the market and bring 
technological innovation to a stand-still. With this in mind, policy 
makers should be more willing to allow the license price to be higher 
than the typical market price, so long as the price is not egregiously 
higher. A reasonableness standard accommodates this goal by 
allowing the patent holder to maintain as much value in his patent as 
possible. 
One way that a compulsory licensing statute can help preserve 
the value of a patent is by putting the burden of proof for 
“reasonableness” on the potential licensee. Such a policy could 
require a potential licensee wishing to license rights to a patented 
technology, to make a reasonable offer to the patent holder. The 
patent holder could choose either to accept the offer or provide a 
reasonable counteroffer. At this point, the patent holder has been 
forced to the table, but has the ability to put forth an offer that it 
thinks would allow it to benefit from its patent. If the potential 
licensee is dissatisfied with the counteroffer, she will have to 
demonstrate to the court that the counter offer is unreasonable. At 
 
 85. See, e.g., Peter Maybarduk & Sarah Rimmington, Compulsory Licenses: A Tool to 
Improve Global Access to the HPV Vaccine?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 323, 325 (2009). 
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this stage in the process, the various methods of intellectual property 
valuation could be helpful, but so long as the patent holder can 
point to some identifiable and well-accepted valuation method used 
in determining its counteroffer, there will be a presumption that the 
asking price is reasonable. 
This type of “reasonable” standard already exists in current 
compulsory licensing statutes. One example is the mandatory licensing 
provision within the Clean Air Act,86 which provision has never been 
litigated.87 Some have suggested that the lack of litigation of this 
provision indicates that the statute is ineffective or unnecessary—
arguing that if nobody bothers to use it, it must not be effective.88 
While this point seems reasonable, the lack of litigation may also be 
evidence that the provision is actually working to encourage parties to 
come to a reasonable agreement on their own. The mere existence of 
a compulsory licensing provision may be enough of an incentive to get 
a patent holder to come to the table. Current experience with the 
Clean Air Act suggests that this may be the case. Furthermore, if 
patent holders are coming to the table, then suppressed technologies 
are being made available to the market. If this is the primary goal, then 
a compulsory licensing scheme with a “reasonable” pricing structure 
can be the means of achieving that goal. 
If a “reasonable” standard helps to ensure that the pricing policy 
is nimble, a heavy damages provision can help to ensure that the 
policy is strong. Under a compulsory licensing statute with a 
“reasonable” licensing fee standard, especially when the burden of 
proof is put on the potential licensee, there is potential concern that 
that patent holder will hold out on negotiations in order to prolong 
the negotiation process and incentivize the potential licensee to 
accept an offer with an outrageously high licensing price. A heavy 
damages provision against the patent holder in the event that the 
court finds its offer unreasonable could help to reduce this risk. This 
type of approach to environmental policy is not new. Current federal 
environmental statutes regularly include high punitive damages 
 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012). 
 87. Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 
4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193, 223 (1991) (noting specifically that “Section 308 [the mandatory 
licensing provision] has never been invoked”). 
 88. See, e.g., Warren F. Schwartz, Mandatory Patent Licensing of Air Pollution Control 
Technology, 57 VA. L. REV. 719 (1971). 
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provisions.89 A standard punitive damage is $37,500 per violation 
per day, with the possibility of treble damages.90 A similar approach 
could be applied to a compulsory licensing statute wherein a patent 
holder who refuses to provide a reasonable license counteroffer could 
be faced with a significant fine for each day that passes before a 
reasonable counteroffer is extended. A damages provision that holds 
would-be patent suppressors liable for unreasonable counteroffers 
could provide the necessary incentive to keep the patent holder from 
making bad-faith licensing demands. 
C. Scope: What Technologies Really Matter? 
In addition to determining the right pricing structure for an ideal 
compulsory licensing regime, it is also necessary to determine the 
scope of any new policy. Given the problems associated with patent 
suppression, it might seem that compulsory licensing provisions 
should be imposed on all technologies. This is probably too extreme. 
Sometimes guaranteeing access to a new technology is not 
particularly beneficial, and may not be worth the added burden 
associated with compulsory licensing.91 Also, the language of the 
Constitution suggests that the general rule should be toward 
exclusive use for limited times.92 Congress is given the authority to 
grant to inventors “exclusive use.” While this is a power given to 
 
 89. See, e.g., Penalty Adjustment Table, 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2013) (showing that many of 
the penalties associated with the Clean Water Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, and Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act can be up to $37,500 per violation per day). 
 90. Id. 
 91. For example, suppose a firm has just developed a technology that will revolutionize 
the jelly bean industry—it has developed an artificial flavor that accurately represents the taste 
of buttered popcorn and doesn’t invoke most customers’ gag reflex. Further suppose that this 
particular concoction does not mix well with normal gelatin products and as a result cannot be 
formed into a jelly bean with currently available technology. The firm thinks that a new gelatin 
product, expected to be released next year, may hold the answer to their problems. Unsure of 
how else to proceed, the firm puts the development of their new jelly bean on hold. 
Meanwhile, a competing candy company gets word of the development in artificial buttered 
popcorn flavoring and wants to force the inventing candy company to license its technology. A 
compulsory license in this scenario would be harmful to the inventing company’s competitive 
edge—one it had developed through a fairly substantial investment in research and 
development—but would not achieve any substantive social benefit. Buttered popcorn flavored 
jelly beans, while enjoyable for novelty’s sake, do not have much of an impact on our overall 
quality of life. The costs of a compulsory licensing policy to a candy company—whose primary 
business model is to come up with novel and sellable candy concepts—is high, while the overall 
benefit to society is low. In this circumstance, compulsory licensing doesn’t seem justified. 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
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Congress to use at its discretion, it still seems pretty clear that the 
Founders anticipated that exclusive use would be the general rule.93 
Also, even with the pricing structure described above, there is still a 
risk of adversely affecting the market price of patents and patent 
licenses. While the urgency of environmental degradation may justify 
this risk under some circumstances, limiting the scope of compulsory 
licensing can help to avoid unnecessarily affecting these market prices 
in less urgent situations. A compulsory licensing regime that is 
limited only to environmentally important technologies can help 
avoid unnecessary market interference. 
1. Why environmental technologies matter 
As has been discussed above, the idea of requiring compulsory 
licensing of socially beneficial technologies is not new. The Atomic 
Energy Act, Clean Air Act, and Plant Variety Protection Act all 
contain compulsory licensing provisions intended to ensure access to 
socially beneficial technologies.94 Additionally, there is a tremendous 
literature arguing for compulsory licensing of life-saving 
pharmaceuticals to the developing world.95 The most compelling 
arguments for these types of policies emphasize their potential for 
achieving social good.96 In a balancing act between the social benefit 
of increased access to important technology and the social cost of 
decreased incentive for innovation, there may be no other technology 
for which the choice to institute a compulsory licensing regime makes 
more sense. Compared to other technologies, ensuring access to those 
technologies which could help solve important environmental 
problems is especially important for three primary reasons: 1) 
environmental problems are increasingly urgent; 2) environmental 
problems have a unique impact on human health; and 3) 
environmental problems have long-term ramifications for multiple 
generations. 
With an ever-growing body of science relating to environmental 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012) (mandating access, under certain 
conditions, to technology capable of reducing harmful emissions); Atomic Energy Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2183 (2012) (mandating access to important energy technology); Plant Variety 
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012) (mandating access to plant technology as a means of 
preserving diversity). 
 95. See, e.g., Maybarduk & Rimmington, supra note 85, at 325. 
 96. Id. 
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degradation and climate change, it is becoming more and more 
apparent that current rates of environmental degradation are 
becoming more urgent.97 Sea levels are rising faster than original 
estimates.98 Over 600 million people live on lands that are ten 
meters or less above sea level.99 While sea levels rise, their waters are 
also becoming more acidic.100 Acidifying waters threaten the quality 
and abundance of fisheries.101 Decreased snowpack in the western 
United States is likely to have drastic effects on the amount of 
available water and is especially distressing given the region’s 
already over-appropriated rivers.102 Besides those environmental 
concerns which are directly related to increased global 
temperatures, other environmental problems present equally urgent 
problems. Agricultural runoff contaminated with fertilizers has 
created a “dead zone” that threatens fisheries in the Gulf Coast.103 
The growing natural gas industry and the process by which natural 
gas is often extracted, hydraulic fracturing, is potentially 
contaminating the groundwater supply for neighboring 
communities.104 Presently, each of these environmental problems 
has the potential for an immediate impact on society. Any 
technological advancement that could help to address these issues 
could have immediate ramifications for those currently affected. 
 
 97. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [I.P.C.C.], 
REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (1997), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/regional/index.php?idp=03; I.P.C.C., CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT], available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. See also Nathaniel Keohane, 
The Urgency of U.S. Action on Climate Change, and the Prospects for Legislation, 18 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2010); Dan Galpern, Climate Change 101: Urgency and Response, 23 J. ENVTL. 
L. & LITIG. 191, 222 (2008). 
 98. Keohane, supra note 97, at 2. 
 99. Gordon McGranahan et al., The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change 
and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones, 19 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 17 
(2007). 
 100. Keohane, supra note 97, at 1. 
 101. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 97, at 1.1. 
 102. COMM. ON W. WATER MGMT., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN 
THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 8, 14 (1992). 
 103. Nancy N. Rabalis et al., Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia, A.K.A. “The Dead Zone,” 33 ANN. 
REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 235, 236 (2002). 
 104. Heather J. Avens et al., Analysis of BTEX Groundwater Concentrations from 
Surface Spills Associated with Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 63:4 J. AIR & WASTE 
MGMT. ASS’N 424 (2013). 
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Similarly, environmental issues can have a unique large-scale 
impact on human health. Global warming has been associated with 
increased levels of malaria, dengue fever, viral encephalitis, and 
cholera.105 Other studies have shown that poor air quality 
contributes to a host of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.106 A 
vaccine, while an important technological advance, may inoculate the 
individual who receives it against a harmful disease or virus, but 
everyone breathes the air, relies on the earth’s soil for its food, and 
drinks the water from the earth’s rivers. Significant technological 
advancement capable of addressing these issues has the potential to 
help improve human health throughout the world. When these types 
of technologies become available, it will be ever important to ensure 
that they are not suppressed. 
Furthermore, many of the environmental problems of our day 
have the potential to be irreversible.107 As such, addressing these 
problems as soon as possible may be critical to preserving our current 
way of life. For example, the desertification of the Middle East and 
sub-Saharan Africa may permanently alter the landscape—rendering 
it unable to support those who live there.108 Similarly, the overuse of 
natural resources and resulting environmental degradation has 
already led to the collapse of civilizations in the new world.109 The 
large-scale environmental changes that took place in these regions 
have been extremely long-lasting and may not be reversible. If 
history repeats itself and current practices lead to new environmental 
degradation, the catastrophic effects could be far-reaching in both 
space and time. 
 
 105. John M. Balbus et al., Climate Change and Emerging Infectious Diseases, 275(3) J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 217 (1996). 
 106. Marion Carey & Martine Dennekamp, Air Quality and Chronic Disease: Why 
Action on Climate Change is Also Good for Health, 21:6 NEW SOUTH WALES PUB. 
HEALTH BULL. 115, 117 (2010). 
 107. See, e.g., S.R. Carpenter et al., Management of Eutrophication for Lakes Subject to 
Potentially Irreversible Change, 9:3 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATION 751 (1999). 
 108. M. B. K. Darkoh, The Nature, Causes and Consequences of Desertification in the 
Drylands of Africa, 9 LAND DEGRADATION & DEV. 1 (1998). 
 109. THE COLLAPSE OF ANCIENT STATES AND CIVILIZATION 6 (Norman Yoffee & 
George L. Cowgill eds. 1991) (noting that political collapse and environmental degradation 
often accompanied each other). 
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2. Which environmental technologies? 
Understanding the importance of diffusing environmental 
technologies is the first step, but determining which environmental 
technologies should be included within the new compulsory 
licensing regime is vital. If we define these technologies too broadly, 
we risk the possibility of interfering with the market unnecessarily. If 
we define these technologies too narrowly, we risk the continuation 
of the same problem which exists today—namely that existing 
compulsory licensing laws do not adequately protect against the 
suppression of important environmentally-friendly technologies. 
Finally, if we define them too loosely, we risk the need for excessive 
litigation—if it is too unclear which technologies should be covered 
under a new policy, courts will be forced to decide. While there are 
no clear answers to these concerns, any new compulsory licensing 
policy should include a clear framework on how to determine which 
technologies should be included. This may be best accomplished by 
a new or existing government agency. Administrative agencies, as 
opposed to Congress, can provide both the requisite scientific 
expertise and administrative flexibility that will be necessary for a 
strong but nimble policy. 
To avoid the need for undue litigation, the agency tasked with 
determining the scope of technologies covered under the new policy 
should provide a clear set of environmental goals and mandate the 
licensing of only those technologies that can help to achieve those 
goals. This kind of policy has the greatest potential to achieve what 
current compulsory licensing law cannot: providing more stability for 
everyone by creating a broad, but predictable set of technologies that 
will be affected. The Environmental Protection Agency may be the 
agency best-equipped for the task because it is already responsible for 
assessing many of the nation’s environmental problems. 
To avoid the need of undue market interference, the agency 
should also only apply the compulsory licensing regime to those 
technologies that are not already otherwise available in the market or 
for which additional competition would be particularly helpful.110 If 
 
 110. Reiko Aoki & John Small, Compulsory Licensing of Technology and the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine, 16:1 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 13 (2004). Addressing the factors that the 
policy makers should consider when expanding compulsory licensing laws, Aoki and Small paid 
particular attention to the importance of only mandating the licenses of technologies that are 
otherwise unavailable. Other factors included the existence of other reasonable requirements 
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a given technology is already readily available in the marketplace and 
there is already sufficient competition, there is no need to interfere 
by mandating licenses to additional market participants. 
With these primary considerations in mind, the agency should 
provide clear guidance for determining whether or not a technology 
falls within the scope of the new policy. By establishing clear 
guidelines and thus ensuring predictability within the system, patent 
holders and licensees can develop clear expectations that will help 
them as they negotiate the terms of their license agreements. To the 
extent that litigation will ensue, the courts will also have clearer 
guidelines than those which currently exist to help them determine 
the scope of mandatory licensing agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the environmental problems facing the world are 
increasingly urgent and a new compulsory licensing scheme in the 
United States could help solve many of these problems. While 
technological innovation potentially holds the key to solving many of 
these problems, those interested in perpetuating the status quo 
currently have the ability to suppress helpful technologies by abusing 
existing patent laws. This application of patent law is inconsistent 
with the historical intent and Constitutional justification for patent 
protection, but it is permissible under current law. Broadening the 
scope of mandatory licensing could help alleviate the problems 
associated with patent suppression, but comes with the risk of 
reducing the incentive to innovate. Any modification of compulsory 
licensing law should be wary of unnecessary risk, but in so doing, 
may be able provide access to important technologies that can help 
solve many of the problems associated with environmental 
degradation. 
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ensuring access to a technology and the ability of the patent owner to profit from his 
invention. 
 
